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A Child is a Child-Or Is It?
Legitimation Under Foreign Law and Its
Immigration Consequences
SANA LOUE*
The Immigration and Nationality Act limits the number of per-
sons who may enter the United States as immigrants in any given
year and establishes a preference system for those who may so
enter. This article analyzes the criteria established by the courts
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service for determination
of preference classification as a legitimated child where the legiti-
mation occurs outside the United States. In the appendix, the au-
thor indexes all Board of Immigration Appeals decisions relating
to legitimation under the laws of other counties. The author con-
cludes that a statutory amendment and the promulgation of addi-
tional regulations would resolve present inconsistencies and would
better effectuate the original purpose of existing immigration
legislation.
INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limits to 270,000 the
number of immigrants who may be admitted to the United States in
any given year,1 exclusive of immediate relatives,2 special immi-
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1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982).
2. "Immediate relatives" refers to "the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen
of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least
twenty-one years of age." § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982).
The immigration and nationality laws of the United States classify the children of
United States citizens in three ways: (1) Certain children of United States citizens are
citizens of the United States at birth. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. (2) Certain children of
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grants,3 refugees, 4 and asylees.5 Individuals subject to the 270,000-
person quota system fall into two categories: those who qualify for
treatment under the INA's system of six preferences,6 and those who
do not so qualify for preferential treatment. Visas are available to
nonpreference applicants only to the extent that the annual supply
has not been exhausted by applicants within the six preference cate-
gories.7 Because of the great demand within the preference catego-
ries, nonpreference visas have been unavailable since mid-1978; pro-
jections indicate that they will continue to be unavailable
indefinitely.8 Thus, an alien's only real chance of obtaining immi-
grant status is to qualify for a preferential classification.
Qualifying for preferential classification is not an easy task; the
law presumes that an applicant for immigrant status does not qualify
unless he demonstrates otherwise.9 The INA favors family relation-
ships, however, and an alien may thereby qualify for preferential
classification. Four of the six preference categories are based upon
family relationships. 10 Further, spouses and children accompanying
United States citizens, who are not United States citizens at birth but are unmarried and
under the age of twenty-one, qualify as "immediate relatives." As such, they are not
subject to the quota restrictions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. § 201(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1151(b). See also § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (defining "child" as "an
unmarried person under twenty-one years of age"). (3) Certain children of United States
citizens, who are not United States citizens at birth but are either married or over
twenty-one, are subject to the quota restrictions of the Act. These children may be eligi-
ble for priority status in the allocation of available immigrant visas because they fall
within the preference system. § 203(a)(1),(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1),(4).
3. The term "special immigrant" refers to an individual within any of the follow-
ing categories: (1) previously lawfully-admitted, permanent residents returning from
temporary foreign visits; (2) certain former United States citizens; (3) certain ministers
of religion; (4) certain former and current employees of the United States Government;
and (5) certain former employees of the Panama Canal Company, the Canal Zone Gov-
ernment, or the United States Government in the Canal Zone. § 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27).
4. § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
5. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
6. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
7. § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § I153(a)(7).
8. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 4.6(g), at 4-
16 (2d ed. 1982).
9. § 203(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
10. The Immigration and Nationality Act as codified provides:
(I) Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed over 20
per centum of the number of specified in section 1151(a) of this title to qualified
immigrants who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United
States.
(2) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 26 per
centum of [270,000], plus any visas not required for the classes specified in par-
agraph (1) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are the spouses, un-
married sons or unnarried daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence.
(4) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
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or following to join the principal alien are entitled to the same status
as the principal alien."' Illegitimate children have a special problem,
because the approval of an illegitimate child's application for prefer-
ential classification may depend upon whether he or she ultimately
qualifies as a "child" within the meaning of the INA, 2 and estab-
lishes the relevant familial relationship. The issue of legitimation is
vitally important to the child's classification under the INA's defini-
tion of a child.
The INA includes within its definition of "child" an unmarried
person under the age of twenty-one who has been legitimated under
the law of either the child's or the father's residence or domicile
prior to the child's eighteenth birthday at a time when the child was
in the legal custody of the legitimating parent.1 " Whether an illegiti-
mate child has been legitimated within the meaning of the INA is a
question of federal law and is determined by examining the child's
centum of [270,000], plus any visas not required for the classes specified in
paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are
the married sons or the married daughters of citizens of the United States.
(5) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed
[270,000], plus any visas not required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are the brothers or
sisters of citizens of the United States, provided such citizens are at least
twenty-one years of age.
§ 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
11. § 203(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8).
12. The statute refers in its preference classifications to "sons or daughters" so as
to avoid the statutory definition of "child," because any person qualifying as the "child"
of a United States citizen is not subject to quota restrictions. I C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.27b, at 2-194 (rev. ed. 1982). Because
the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define "son or daughter," the courts and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service have determined who is a "son or daughter"
of a United States citizen by reference to the statutory definition of "child," except for
the provisions regarding age and marital status. Id. § 2.27c, at 2-196.
13. § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(b)(1)(C). Unless local law dictates to the
contrary, the father's "natural right" to the custody of a child he has legitimated is equal
to the mother's "natural right" to custody. In re Rivers, 17 I. & N. Dec. 419, 421
(1980), modifying In re Harris, 15 I. & N. Dec. 39 (1970); In re Dela Rosa, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 728 (1974). Although the effect of legitimation is retroactive and confers the full
status and rights of a legitimate child as of the date of birth, 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 162
(1920), the child must have met all of the requirements for legitimation at the time the
visa petition is filed, in order to qualify for relative preference classification under section
203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In re Bardouille, I.D. No. 2880, slip op.
at 4 (BIA 1981). For a discussion of the conflict of laws problem associated with the
issue of legitimation, see Note, Ending Discrimination Against Unwed Fathers and Their
Illegitimate Children Under Immigration Laws, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 146 (1981).
The Act also defines "child" to include legitimate children, stepchildren, adopted chil-
dren, certain orphans, and illegitimate children claiming immigration benefits by virtue
of their relationship to their mothers. § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).
filial rights under the laws of the child's and the father's domicile
and residence.14
Various courts15 and the Board of Immigration Appeals16 have
construed the statute as requiring that the illegitimate child's rights
equal the rights of legitimate children in the jurisdiction of the
child's or the father's domicile or residence. These decisions have
been inconsistent where the legitimation of the child has been in ac-
cordance with foreign law. 17 As case holdings evidence, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not always satisfacto-
rily construed the INA's relevant provisions in light of the legislative
intent.18 This article explores the validity of the current construction
of "legitimation" in cases involving foreign law and recommends
modifications of existing legislation.19
BUILDING BLOCKS TO A WORD:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF "LEGITIMATION"
Several basic principles govern the interpretation of a statute. The
starting point of any such examination is the language of the statute
itself.20 Unless the statute defines its words otherwise, they will be
interpreted as having their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing."' The circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment may
convince a court, however, that the legislature did not intend a word
to have its ordinary meaning.2 2 Further, the courts will give substan-
tial deference to the construction given to a statute by a department
charged with its administration, 23 particularly where that construc-
14. de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 660 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd 690
F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1982). Where an act is insufficient to establish the legitimacy of an
illegitimate child under the enumerated laws, the child remains illegitimate for immigra-
tion purposes even though the same act in another country would have established legiti-
macy. See In re Rodriguez, I.D. No. 2854 (RC 1980).
15. E.g., de los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1982); Peignand v. INS, 440
F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1971).
16. E.g., In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512 (1980); In re Clahar, 16 I. & N. Dec.
484 (1978); In re Remy, 14 I. & N. Dec. 183 (1972).
17. Compare In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512 (1980) with In re Lee, 16 1. & N.
Dec. 305 (1977).
18. See Reyes v. INS, 478 F. Supp. 63, 65-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Delgado v. INS,
473 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
19. This article does not include an examination of foreign laws which abolish all
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. Children to whom such a law
applies would be legitimate under section 101(b)(1)(A) of the INA, rather than "legiti-
mated" within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(C). See infra note 42.
20. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
21. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931).
23. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1979). See K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 120-21 (6th ed. 1977). The courts have
shown such deference to interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act made by
the Department of Justice, which includes the Immigration and Naturalization Service
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tion has been consistent over a long period of time. 4
The Courts' Struggle to Define "Legitimation"
In their attempts to ascertain the meaning of the word "legiti-
mated," the courts have reviewed the legislative history behind the
enactment of section 101(b)(1)(C). 2 5 Prior to the enactment of the
INA, the United States immigration laws contained no provision for
regularizing the immigration status of legitimated children. The de-
termination as to when an illegitimate child constituted a "child" for
immigration purposes remained the province of administrative agen-
cies.26 In 1952, Congress included section 101(b)(1)(C) as part of
the INA27 based upon a recommendation by the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary that illegitimate children be eligible for preferential
classification if they had been legitimated. 28 The recommendation
was essentially a statutory codification of a Department of State reg-
ulation classifying legitimated children as children within the mean-
ing of the immigration laws.2 9 The Senate Committee understood a
"legitimated" child to be an illegitimate child who had received all
and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and by the Department of State. See, e.g.,
Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981). The Immigration and Nationality Act
itself provides for such deference:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of this [Act] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturaliza-
tion of aliens, except insofar as this [Act] or such laws relate to the powers,
functions, and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State, the
officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided,
however, that determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to
all questions of law shall be controlling.
§ 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
24. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981).
25. E.g., de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 663-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
26. Id. at 663-64.
27. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(b)(1)(C), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(l)(C) (1982)).
28. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1950).
29. The regulation provided:
A petition for nonquota status for an illegitimate child who is an alien may be
filed with the Department of Justice when the petition is executed by the
mother, if she is a citizen of the United States, or by the father, if he has subse-
quently married the mother of the illegitimate child and thereby conferred on
the child the rights of legitimacy or has legitimated the child under the law of
his domicil, and if he is an American citizen.
22 C.F.R. § 42.209 (1949). The report recommended that the statutory term "child"
include illegitimate children "if legitimated under the law of either the child's or the
father's residence or domicile [and] if the legitimation takes place before the child
reaches the age of 16 and while in the custody of the legitimating parent." S. REP. No.
1515, supra note 28.
of the benefits of legitimacy, the same meaning given the word by
the Department of State regulation.
The courts have also interpreted the INA's use of the word "legiti-
mated" by reference to the prevailing interpretation of other statutes
that share the same language or general purpose, or that deal with
the same subject.30 The United States nationality laws are closely
related to the immigration laws.81 The nationality laws, codified in
the INA, define "child" to include children who have been legiti-
mated.32 The INA also provides for derivative citizenship for illegiti-
mate children of United States citizens where paternity has been es-
tablished by legitimation. 3 United States nationality law first
addressed the status of illegitimate children as part of the National-
ity Act of 1940. a" Congress substantially re-enacted these provisions
as part of the INA, which is still in effect. 5 Prior to the passage of
the Nationality Act of 1940, the citizenship of foreign-born children
of United States citizens was governed by section 1993 of the Re-
vised 'Statutes of the United States. 6 Under this provision, the
courts and administering agencies resolved the question of eligibility
of illegitimate children for derivative citizenship. The Department of
State maintained that a child qualified if he or she had been legiti-
mated under the laws of the father's domicile.3 7 Although the De-
partment of Justice endorsed this approach,3 8 the courts maintained
that "child," within the context of section 1993, referred only to le-
gitimate children.3 9
30. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428
(1973) (per curiam).
31. Nationality law and immigration law in the United States were at one time
enacted in separate legislation. Congress merged the two bodies of law into a single stat-
utory scheme in 1952. 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 1l.6b, at 11-18 to 21 (rev. ed. 1982).
32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § l101(c)(1). For a
complete discussion of the rights of legitimated children under United States nationality
laws, see 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE
§§ 13.11(a)-(b), at 13-47 to -54 (rev. ed. 1982).
33. § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
34. Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
35. de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
36. Section 1993, as amended, provided that:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States
whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen
of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father
or citizen mother, as the case may be, has resided in the United States previous
to the birth of such child.
As amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250 § 1, 48 Stat. 797.
37. To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States into a Com-
prehensive Nationality Code: Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the Comm. on Immigration
and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 431 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
38. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 556, 558-59 (1937).
39. See, e.g., Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 558, 589 (1st Cir.
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The Nationality Act of 1940 resolved this dispute between the De-
partment of Justice and the courts by allowing illegitimate children
to receive derivative citizenship if they were legitimated under the
law of their domicile while in the custody of the legitimating par-
ent.40 Testimony during the hearings on this legislation indicates that
Congress understood a legitimated child to be one whom the law
treated "as if it had been born legitimately." '41
The Board's Interpretation of "Legitimation"
The Board of Immigration Appeals has generally construed sec-
tion 101(b)(1)(C), the statutory provision governing legitimation, as
requiring that an illegitimate child possess all the legal attributes of
a legitimate child to be deemed legitimated.42 This interpretation is
consistent with the ordinary meaning of "legitimation"4 and with
1928); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927).
40. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, §§ 102(h), 205, 54 Stat. 1138,
1139-40 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(c)(1), 1409 (1982)).
41. Hearings, supra note 37, at 62 (remarks of R.W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal
Advisor, Department of State). Congress' adoption of this definition of "legitimated" is
reflected in its rejection of a proposal by the National Council on Naturalization and
Citizenship, providing for the derivative citizenship of children who, although acknowl-
edged by their fathers, did not enjoy all of the rights of legitimate children. See id. at
392-94.
42. See, e.g., In re Remy, 14 I. & N. Dec. 183 (1972); In re Greer, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 16 (1972); In re Gouveia, 13 1. & N. Dec. 604 (1970); In re Doble-Pena, 13 I. &
N. Dec. 366 (1969); In re Monma, 12 1. & N. Dec. 265 (1967); In re Lauer, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 210 (1967); In re Mandewirth, 12 I. & N. Dec. 199 (1967); In re Anastasiadis, 12
1. & N. Dec. 99 (1967); In re Van Pamelen, 12 1. & N. Dec. 11 (1966); In re Maungca,
11 1. & N. Dec. 885 (1966); In re The, 10 I. & N. Dec. 744 (1964); In re Archer, 10 I.
& N. Dec. 92 (1962); In re C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 597 (1962); In re C-, 9 I. & N. Dec.
268 (1961); In re J-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 246 (1961); In re W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 223
(1961); In re F-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 448 (1957); In re D-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 438 (1957); In
re J-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 338 (1956). Where a country abolishes all legal distinctions
between children born in and out of wedlock, the children are deemed to be "legitimate"
within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(A) of the INA. See, e.g., In re Pavlovic, 17 I. &
N. Dec. 407 (1980); In re Hernandez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 7 (1979) (the foreign equaliza-
tion law already existed at the time of the child's birth). See also 60 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 204 (1983); 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 358 (1982). But see, In re G-, 9 I. & N.
Dec. 518 (1961) (BIA found child legitimated rather than legitimate even though equal-
izing law in effect at time of child's birth). However, where the foreign equalization law
is enacted after the child's birth, it is a legitimatizing law even if retroactive, and the
child is considered "legitimated" within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(C). E.g., In re
Martinez, I.D. No. 2941 (BIA 1983) (Cuba); In re Campuzano, I.D. No. 2940 (BIA
1983) (Ecuador); In re Clarke, I.D. No. 2935 (BIA 1983) (Barbados). See also 60
INTERPRETER RELEASES 204 (1983).
43. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1291 (unabridged ed. 1981) defines the adjective "legitimate" as "born in wed-
lock" and the verb as "to put [a bastard] in the position or state of a legitimate child."
other legal authority."' The Board has departed, however, from this
construction on several occasions.
The Board of Immigration Appeals considered whether "recogni-
tion" under Korean law constituted "legitimation" under section
101(b)(1)(C) in In re Lee. 5 Korean law provides that the oldest le-
gitimate son succeed any "recognized" son in assuming the role of
"Head of Family." Succession to this role entitles that child to
greater inheritance rights than his siblings. The Board noted that
"the concept of 'Head of Family' is entirely foreign to United States
common law, and has no parallel in United States parent-child rela-
tions."'46 At first, the Board concluded that such "recognition" con-
stituted "legitimation." The Board found that since "all the remain-
ing rights and duties are identical, [the distinction in inheritance
rights] should be deemed irrelevant to the issue of immigration bene-
fits, as beyond the twin goals of family unity and the prevention of
immigration fraud.' 7 Although the Board ultimately withdrew from
the Lee construction of section 101(b) (1)(C), 4 8 its conclusions in
other cases refute any claim to consistency.
The Board initially found in In re Clahar9 that Jamaica's Status
of Children Act of 1976 did not establish for children born out of
wedlock rights coextensive with those of children born in wedlock or
with children legitimated by the marriage of their natural parents.
This decision rested upon the existence of various legal distinctions
between children born in and out of wedlock, including differences in
rights to property from inter vivos, testamentary, and intestate dis-
positions. 50 The Board distinguished In re Lee,51 finding the Jamai-
can statute "significantly different" from the Korean statute "be-
cause the Jamaican statute provides for fundamental exceptions
which affect the substantial rights of children born out of wed-
lock." 52 The Board subsequently modified its original Clahar hold-
ing,53 finding that a child within the scope of the Jamaican Status of
Children Act could be included within the section 101 (b)(1)(C) defi-
nition of a "legitimated" child, notwithstanding the legal differences
in inheritance rights." This decision was based upon a memorandum
44. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 811 (rev. ed. 1979) defines the verb "legitimate" as
"To make lawful, to confer legitimacy; to place a child born before marriage on the
footing of those born in lawful wedlock."
45. 16 I. & N. Dec. 305 (1977).
46. Id. at 307.
47. Id.
48. In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512, 517 (1980).
49. 16 I. & N. Dec. 484 (1978).
50. Id. at 488-89.
51. 16 I. & N. Dec. 305 (1977).
52. 16 1. & N. Dec. at 489.
53. In re Clahar, I.D. No. 2852 (BIA 1981).
54. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
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prepared by the Jamaican Justice Ministry, indicating that the stat-
utory distinctions in question resulted "from a legislative attempt to
minimize the problems associated with determining rights and status
in an area where difficulties may arise in identifying the natural fa-
ther of a child rather than from any intent to treat children born out
of wedlock less favorably than those born in wedlock."
55
In re Jancar56 presented the Board with a similar issue, requiring
it to consider whether acknowledgement of paternity under Yugoslav
law57 was the equivalent of legitimation under section 101(b)(1)(C).
In this case, also, the inheritance rights of an acknowledged child
differed from those of a legitimate child. The Board emphasized the
similarities in the status of legitimate and acknowledged children
58
and concluded, despite the distinction in inheritance rights, that the
child met the requirements of section 101(b) (1) (C).
The Board's inconsistent interpretations of the ordinary meaning
of "legitimated" have prompted the courts to resolve this dilemma
by looking to the purpose that Congress sought to serve by its enact-
ment of section 101(b)(1)(C). 5 9 In Lee,6 the Board recognized that
the preference system incorporated in the immigration laws of the
United States reflects a congressional recognition of the desirability
of maintaining or fostering the unity of immigrant families."' More
55. Id., slip op. at 3.
56. 11 I. & N. Dec. 365 (1965). The Board, in reliance upon Article 58 of the
Yugoslav constitution, later overruled Jancar and concluded that all distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children had been abolished and children born out of wedlock
are considered equal at birth to those born in wedlock with respect to the rights and
duties of the parents towards them. In re Pavlovic, 17 I. & N. Dec. 407 (1980).
57. The Yugoslav law provided that a child born out of wedlock would acquire the
status or a status similar to that of a child born in wedlock by three methods: legitima-
tion by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents, by court decree, or by acknowl-
edgement of the natural father. In re Jancar 11 1. & N. Dec. 365, 367.
58. "[L]egitimation through acknowledgement of paternity is effective with respect
to everyone ... family relations thenceforth exist between the child and the natural
father .. both the father and the mother exercise parental power over the child." Id. at
368.
59. de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)). Even where the statute's
meaning is clear, the court will not interpret a provision according to its plain meaning
where to do so "would lead to a result that conflicts with common sense and that is
unreasonable in light of the evident statutory purpose." Id. (citing In re Adamo, 619
F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980)).
60. 16 1. & N. Dec. 305 (1977).
61. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See also Lau v. Kiley, 563
F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977). But see In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512, 516 (1980), in which
the Board noted that "although one must be mindful of the purpose of the immigration
laws to preserve the family unit, it must also be recognized that section 101(b) in fact
embodies the Congressional conclusions as to which familial relationships warrant
than one court has extrapolated from this a concurrent congressional
desire to reduce the incidence of fraudulent preference petitions,6"
reasoning that a reduction in fraudulent preference classifications
creates additional visas for members of bona fide families and
thereby effectuates Congress' intent to unify families.03 The INS has
argued that fraud is averted by requiring that legitimated children
have all of the rights of legitimate children because individuals will
be less likely to claim as children those persons upon whom they
must confer full filial rights.64 Several courts, although recognizing
agency expertise in this area,65 and an INS need to prevent fraudu-
lent schemes, 6 have commented upon the irrationality of this rea-
soning67 and the inconsistency of its application.68 However, the
recognition."
62. See, e.g., de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. Id. at 669-70.
64. de los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. It is not the province of the courts to insist that the INS' interpretations of
the Act result in the perfect immigration scheme, or even that they be the best
interpretations possible; rather, the INS is given a fair amount of latitude to
exercise its judgment as to what interpretations will best elfectuate the goals of
the Act.
Id. at 60. See also Delgados v. INS, 473 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
66. Delgado v. INS, 473 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
67. The Delgado court found the Board's rulings with respect to a legitimation
provision questionable. The Board in that case had found that the beneficiary, although
legitimated under the law of the Dominican Republic, was not legitimated within the
meaning of section 101(b)(1)(C) because his right to inherit intestate would be less than
that of a legitimate child. The court criticized the Board's reasoning with respect to this
particular provision.
It hardly seems likely that persons will more readily lend themselves to fraudu-
lent legitimations because their fraudulently acknowledged "children" would
thereby be entitled to only half the inheritance of a natural child in an intestate
distribution. Furthermore, even assuming a significant number of fraudulent
"parents" could in theory be affected by a difference in the acknowledged child's
right to inherit intestate, what possible basis short of pure speculation could
justify the supposition that these individuals would find acceptable the right of
children acknowledged under Law 985 to inherit 50% of the statutory share of
their natural children?
The rule adopted has no reasonable relation to preventing fraud, and it ignores
the "foremost policy underlying the granting of preference visas under our im-
migration laws, the reunification of families . . . ." (citation omitted).
473 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The same court further noted:
A person so aware of the consequences of fraudulently legitimating a child as to
be affected by intestate inheritance rights, could readily avoid any risk of the
legitimated child's inheriting any part of his or her property by cutting off the
"child" in a will. Under the Board's view, a legitimation law that allowed an
individual to disinherit a legitimated child is entitled to respect, even though it
presents far more substantial possibilities of fraud than the aspect of Dominican
law that merely reduces the acknowledged child's intestate rights.
Id. at 1348 n.6. See also Reyes v. INS, 478 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). But see de
los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1981):
[T]hat the deterrent effect of requiring an illegitimate child to show that it has
filial rights coextensive with those of a legitimate child can only be appreciated
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courts have consistently upheld the INS' construction of section
101(b)(1)(C), limiting their own function to an examination of
"whether the statute, so .interpreted, is reasonably calculated to
serve these purposes,"6 9 and thereby avoiding a determination of
whether the INS' construction best effectuates the purposes of the
statute.
70
The legislative history of section 101(b)(1)(C), the Board of Im-
migration Appeals' general, although somewhat inconsistent, inter-
pretation of the term "legitimated," and the ordinary meaning of
that word provide strong ammunition in the INS' battle to avert
fraud by limiting the definition of "legitimation." However, a read-
ing which is both more humane and more cognizant of the existence
of varying systems of foreign law is supported by the verbalized con-
gressional purpose behind the provision's enactment and the Board's
acknowledgement of that purpose in various decisions.
A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF SECTION 101(b)(1)(C)
The courts7 1 and the Board of Immigration Appeals7 2 have ac-
knowledged Congress' intent to facilitate family reunification. Each
adjudicative body is cognizant, as well, of legitimation requirements
in various countries which mandate the marriage of the natural par-
ents and thereby render legitimation by the -natural father impossible
in some cases .7 Despite a desire to define the relevant provisions of
the immigration laws in such a way as to recognize all bona fide
familial relationships,7 4 and despite Congress' continual emphasis on
family reunification as a major component of any immigration legis-
by taking a broad view of the scope of such rights and also by considering how
such rights are conferred on an illegitimate child . . . . As a practical matter,
then, the requirement that an illegitimate child have the full rights of legitimacy
to be eligible for a preferential immigration classification is, in a great number
of cases, really a requirement that the parents of the child marry. Such a re-
quirement is reasonably calculated to deter fraud: the willingness of a person to
commit fraud in order to gain preferential immigration status for a child is cer-
tainly likely to be lessened if the fraud can only be accomplished by marrying
the child's mother.
68. Reyes v. INS, 478 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Delgado v. INS, 473 F.
Supp. 1343, 1348 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
69. de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
70. Id.
71. E.g., Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1977); de los Santos v. INS, 525
F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
72. E.g., In re Lee, 16 I. & N. Dec. 305 (1977).
73. See, e.g., de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 669 n.1l (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512, 517 n.3 (1980).
74. In re Reyes, 17 1. & N. Dec. 512, 517 n.3 (1980).
lation,'7 5 the Board78 and the courts" are reluctant to construe sec-
tion 101(b)(1)(C) more broadly absent a redrafting of the existing
legislation. Unfortunately, recent sentiment in Congress has been of
a restrictive, rather than expansive nature,78 rendering unlikely any
move by Congress which would ultimately increase the number of
persons eligible for preferential classification.
Whether the expansion of the meaning of "child" would result in
a greater number of petitions or eligible persons is questionable.
Under existing legislation, the father's wife, if a United States citi-
zen or lawfully admitted permanent resident alien, can petition for
the child as a stepchild, 79 even though the father is unable to petition
for the child as a legitimated child. In actuality, the expansion of the
meaning of "child" for immigration purposes would merely facilitate
the petition process.
75. See, e.g., Interview with Senator Alan K. Simpson, reprinted in IV UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION NEws 1-2 (April 1983); Letter from Congressman Peter W.
Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to the Editor of the New York
Times, reprinted in part in II UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION NEWS 1-2 (September 3,
1982); Letter from Bill Archer, Member of the House of Representatives to F. S. Halim,
Esq., Houston, Texas (July 23, 1982).
76. Legitimation requirements which mandate marriage of the natural parents
often make legitimation by the natural father impossible. This can of course be
true even where a strong family tie exists between the father and child. That
such relationships cannot be recognized under the clear terms of section
101(b)(1) tempts one to define the provisions therein so that all bona fide famil-
ial relationships can be recognized. We believe this result can only be lawfully
accomplished, however, by a redrafting of the law in question by Congress.
In re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512, 517 n.3 (1980) (emphasis added).
77. The Court tends to agree ... that a rule requiring something less than
full rights of legitimacy as a predicate to receiving preferential immigration
classification would effectively deter fraud and at the same time would permit
unification of bona fide immigrant families where, as a practical matter, the
illegitimate child cannot be given the full rights of legitimacy . . . . Plaintiff's
persuasive argument that a better means of serving the goals of the INA is
available should, in the final analysis, be addressed to Congress.
de los Santos v. INS, 525 F. Supp. 655, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). This court's conclusion
is not surprising as the courts have consistently found the power of Congress to deter-
mine what classes of aliens may enter the United States to be plenary and unqualified.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). For a discussion of the constitutionality of
this premise as it relates to illegitimate children, see Comment, Discrimination Based on
Sex and Illegitimacy Is Permissible in the Immigration Area-Fiallo v. Bell, 27 DE
PAUL L. REV. 515 (1977); Comment, "Legitimate" Discrimination Against Illegiti-
mates: A Look at Trimble v. Gordon and Fiallo v. Bell, 16 J. FAM. L. 57 (1977).
78. See supra note 75.
79. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(1)(B)
(1982). For example, suppose father F had an illegitimate child C in country X, with
Mother M. Suppose further that F had acknowledged C under the laws of X, but because
F was married to wife W at the time of C's birth, full legitimation is not possible. Pursu-
ant to the current construction of "child," F can not petition for C as a legitimated child
under section 101(b)(1)(C). However, W, if a United States citizen or lawfully admitted
permanent resident, can petition for C within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(B).
Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980); Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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The inclusion of a greater number of children within section
101(b)(1)(C) need not result in a reduction of available visas due to
fraudulent petitions. Various regulations now provide checks on
other types of applications.80 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service could promulgate similar regulations to govern the adjudica-
tion procedure of such petitions. Further, such a statutory revision
would recognize the importance of other family relationships in the
cultures of many countries,81 and would better serve the goal of fam-
ily reunification.
80. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1, 204.2, 214.2 (1983).
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